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In July 1990, the New York Court of Appeals held in Niesig
v. Team I that lawyers for a plaintiff suing a corporation may
conduct direct, informal interviews with certain employees of
the corporate party without the presence or consent of the cor-
poration's counsel. The court found that an attorney has the le-
gal and ethical right to conduct ex parte interviews with any em-
ployees who do not function as "alter egos" of the corporation.
This broad and far-reaching decision, the first definitive inter-
pretation of Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A)(1) of New York's Code
of Professional Responsibility (the "Rule"),1 represents a further
development in the judicial trend of expanding opportunities for
attorneys to conduct informal interviews with corporate employ-
ees in the interest of efficient, cost-effective fact-finding.
2
An established rule of professional ethics, Disciplinary Rule
* 76 N.Y.2d 363, 558 N.E.2d 1030, 559 N.Y.S.2d 493 (1990), afg and modifying 149
A.D.2d 94, 545 N.Y.S.2d 153 (2d Dep't 1989).
1 Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A)(1) provides:
During the course of his repriesentation of a client a lawyer shall not:
1. Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the repre-
sentation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter
unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing such other party or
is authorized by law to do so.
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsmiLrrY, N.Y. JUD. LAw App. (McKinney Supp. 1991).
2 This decision affects many national and international corporations that are head-
quartered in New York. Furthermore, other states may be inclined to follow New York's
influential court of appeals. Thomas F. Clauss, Jr. & Maria M. Homan, Recent Case
Highlights Trend in Favor of Ex Parte Interviews, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 10, 1990, at 24 (ana-
lyzing the Niesig opinion and its ramifications).
As support for its ruling that DR 7-104(A)(1) allows broad access to corporate em-
ployees for discovery purposes, the Niesig opinion cited two state supreme court deci-
sions, six federal district court decisions, eleven bar association opinions and the ABA/
BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct. 76 N.Y.2d at 375 n.5, 558 N.E.2d at
1036 n.5, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 499 n.5. Included was a leading case for the alter ego standard,
Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 691 P.2d 564 (Wash. 1984) (in a medical malpractice
action, court held that plaintiffs had a right to conduct ex parte interviews of any em-
ployees of defendant hospital who did not have managing authority sufficient to give
them the right to speak for and bind the corporation).
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7-104(A)(1) prohibits a lawyer from communicating with a party
she knows to be represented by a lawyer without that lawyer's
consent. The Rule is founded upon strong policy grounds and
seeks to promote the effectiveness of the legal system and to
protect parties from improper and unethical approaches by ad-
verse counsel.' When the "parties" are individuals in civil cases,
application of the Rule is fairly straightforward. It prevents ex
parte contacts between the counseled individual, not his agents
or employees, and adverse counsel.4 However, when a "party" is
a corporation or other business entity, the scope of the Rule is
unclear. The Rule itself does not define the term "party," nor
does it offer lawyers the means by which to determine its
breadth.
While plaintiffs' lawyers have recognized that DR 7-
104(A)(1) precludes contacts with some employees of a corporate
party, they have argued that the ban on ex parte communication
should apply only to "control-group" employees, that is, the
most senior officers who exercise substantial control over the
corporation's operations.5 Not surprisingly, defendant companies
have insisted that the Rule should be interpreted to preclude ex
parte communication with all employees on the ground that a
corporate "party" is synonymous with all of its employees." Al-
though courts, bar associations and commentators have at-
tempted to resolve this issue by balancing each side's competing
interests, they have not devised a satisfactory, workable stan-
dard for determining the reach of DR 7-104(A)(1) where a party
is a business entity.7
I Jerome N. Krulewitch, Ex Parte Communications with Corporate Parties: The
Scope of the Limitations on Attorney Communications with One of Adverse Interest, 82
Nw. U.L. REV. 1274 (1988) (citing ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances,
Formal Op. 108 (1934) (extensive overview of DR 7-104(A)(1), its underlying policies,
goals and application)):
" Niesig, 76 N.Y.2d at 370, 558 N.E.2d at 1033, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 496 (citing STEPHEN
GILLERS & NORMAN DORSEN, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHics 433
(2d ed. 1989)).
' See, e.g., Daniel B. Moskowitz, At the Corporate Level, Opinions Differ on the
Definition of Legal Ethics, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 1990, at F32 (reviewing the potential
effects of Niesig on the business community).
6Id.
For a comprehensive overview of four of the tests used to determine the breadth of
a corporate "party" under DR 7-104(A)(1), see Krulewitch, supra note 3; see also John
D. Hodson, Annotation, Right of Attorney to Conduct Ex Parte Interviews with Corpo-
rate Party's Nonmanagement Employees, 50 A.L.R.4th 652 (1986).
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The New York Court of Appeals considered the issue in
Niesig v. Team I and determined that corporate "parties" in-
clude those corporate employees "whose acts or omissions in the
matter under inquiry are binding on the corporation ... or im-
puted to the corporation for purposes of its liability, or [who
are] implementing the advice of counsel."8 In doing so, the court
embraced the "alter ego" test, arguing that this approach repre-
sents a fair compromise between the goal of protecting parties
from unscrupulous practices of overzealous opposing counsel and
the policy favoring open access to information and discovery.,
The court pointed out that the "alter ego" test has been "over-
whelmingly adopted by courts and bar associations throughout
the country" and has "long practical experience . . . in day-to-
day operation." ' Finally, the court argued that the alter ego test
finds strong support in the well-developed law of evidence and
agency.
11
This Comment examines the alter ego approach adopted by
the New York Court of Appeals in Niesig v. Team I to shed
light on the scope of Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A)(1) when the
party being questioned is a corporation. Part I describes the Dis-
ciplinary Rule and its underlying policies and reviews the deci-
sions of the appellate division and court of appeals. Part II
surveys the different tests courts have used to interpret the
scope of the Rule and weighs the successes and failures of these
tests in fulfilling the Rule's objectives. This Comment concludes
that the court of appeals' espousal of a modified alter ego test
represents the best method of interpreting the Rule as it relates
to corporate parties: it satisfactorily balances protection for par-
ties against the need for information; it is supported by case law
and bar association opinions; and it is well-grounded in the law
of evidence and agency. Finally, this Comment recommends
practical approaches attorneys can take to comply with the
Niesig test.
8 76 N.Y.2d at 374, 558 N.E.2d at 1035, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 498.
9Id.





A. Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A) (1)
The Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated by
the American Bar Association and adopted with modifications
by New York State, prescribes high standards of ethical conduct
to which all lawyers must adhere in their professional dealings.1 2
The Code is comprised of three separate *but related parts: ca-
nons,13 ethical considerations, 14 and disciplinary rules. The disci-
plinary rules are mandatory and "state the minimum level of
conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to
disciplinary action."' The Code does not define either discipli-
nary procedures or penalties for violation of the disciplinary
rules, but it provides that the type of judgment to be levied shall
be determined according to the character of the offense and the
attendant circumstances. 6
Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A)(1) of the New York State Code
of Professional Responsibility provides:
Communicating with One of Adverse Interest
(A) During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall
not:
(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of
the representation with a party he knows to be represented by a law-
2 CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, N.Y. JUD. LAW App. (McKinney Supp.
1991) (Preliminary Statement).
" The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms
the standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships
with the public, with the legal system, and with the legal profession. They em-
body the general concepts from which the Ethical Considerations and Discipli-
nary Rules are derived.
Id.
1d "The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and represent the
objectives toward which every member of the profession should strive. They constitute a
body of principles upon which the lawyer can rely for guidance." Id.
15 Id. See N.Y. JuD. LAW § 90(2) (McKinney 1983) ("[T]he appellate division of the
supreme court in each department is authorized to censure, suspend from practice or
remove from office any attorney... who is guilty of professional misconduct. . . ."); see
also N.Y. RULES OF COURT § 603.2 (McKinney 1991) (1st Dep't) (professional misconduct
defined); id. § 691.2 (2d Dep't) (same); id. § 806.2 (3d Dep't) (grievance program); id. §
1022.17 (4th Dep't) (grievance plan).
"6 Penalties can be very severe and may include disqualification or even disbarment.
See, e.g., Papanicolaou v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 720 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (court disqualified entire law firm as a result of one partner's ex parte communica-
tion with plaintiff, since it found such communication had tainted the case).
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yer in that matter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer repre-
senting such other party or is authorized by law to do so.17
The historical purposes of the Rule and its predecessor, the
American Bar Association's original Canon 9,18 were two-fold: to
preserve the proper functioning of the attorney-client relation-
ship and to shield the adverse party from improper approaches
and unjust pressures.19 It is this latter function that is most
often stressed;20 theoretically, the presence of a party's attorney
" CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104(A)(1) N.Y. JUD. LAw App. (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1991).
Compare Model Rule 4.2 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the more
modem ethics code established by the ABA in 1983, which is substantially similar to DR
7-104(A)(1):
Communication with Person Represented by Counsel
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of
the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another
lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or
is authorized by law to do so.
MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCr Rule 4.2 (1983).
Each of the Model Rules is accompanied by an explanatory Comment. A Comment,
according to the Scope note that introduces the Model Rules, does not add obligations to
the Rules. Instead, the Comments are to "provide guidance for practicing in compliance
with the Rules." However, "[t]he Comments were also doubtless designed and will be
employed by courts and other disciplinary officials as an authoritative and illustrative
guide to interpretation of language in the Rules." CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL
ETHICS § 2.6.4, at 63 (1986). The Comment to Model Rule 4.2 explicitly describes the
breadth of the prohibition on communications with corporate parties. To date, the
Model Rules have not been adopted by New York's appellate division, which has the
authority to enforce ethical standards imposed upon attorneys.
18 The original Canon 9 codified by the ABA in 1908 stated:
A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy
with a party represented by counsel; much less should he undertake to negoti-
ate or compromise the matter with him, but should deal only with his counsel.
ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 9 (1908). Canon 9 was superseded by the
ABA's adoption of the Model Code in 1970.
19 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 108 (1934).
For the history of Canon 9 and the subsequent Rule, see Lewis Kurlantzik, The
Prohibition on Communication with an Adverse Party, 51 CoNN. B.J. 136 (1977) (argu-
ing in a detailed policy-oriented discussion that the present Rule banning all ex parte
communication with parties has strong support); but cf. John Leubsdorf, Communicat-
ing with Another Lawyer's Client, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 683, 684-85 (1979) (arguing that the
Rule reinforces traditional patterns of lawyer control over information vital to clients,
and hence over those clients' affairs, which is inconsistent with principles of personal
responsibility otherwise recognized in the law).
20 See, e.g., Kurlantzik, supra note 19, at 139 (A lay person making a statement is
"unaware of the technical procedural and evidentiary framework in which he is, in fact,
operating. This relative ignorance necessitates limitation by some means of overreaching,
and opportunity for overreaching, by the lawyer.").
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counterbalances contacts between the party and his or her ad-
versary.2 However, other justifications for the Rule include:
preventing attorneys from "stealing clients,"22 preventing attor-
neys from negotiating unfavorable settlements directly with cli-
ents,23 protecting clients from inadvertently disclosing damaging
privileged information, 4 facilitating settlement by channeling
disputes through lawyers accustomed to the negotiation pro-
cess,25 and rescuing lawyers from a difficult conflict between
their duty to advance their clients' interests and their duty not
to take advantage of an unprotected opposing party.26 The Rule
is also intended to assure standards of simple fairness and ethi-
cal behavior on the part of all attorneys and to protect the
party's right to effective representation.27
While the standard explanations for the Rule tend to em-
phasize the dangers of informal ex parte communication, the
fact is that attorneys will inevitably seek the advantages of in-
terviewing witnesses outside the presence of counsel. An infor-
mal interview is often the best way for an attorney to ascertain
what, if any, information a witness may have that is relevant to
her theory of the case because witnesses are generally more in-
clined to speak freely in the course of an informal interview. 28 As
2 Niesig, 76 N.Y.2d at 370, 558 N.E.2d at 1032-33, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 495-96 (quoting
Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 691 P.2d 564, 567 (Wash. 1984) ("the presence of the
party's attorney theoretically neutralizes the contact")).
22 HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHics 190 (1953) (arguing that a lawyer has an obliga-
tion under the Code not to steal clients), cited in Wright, 691 P.2d at 567; see also
Polycast Technology Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 621, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("DR
7-104(A)(1) preserves the integrity of the attorney-client relationship .... That is, coun-
sel is precluded from driving a wedge between the opposing attorney and that attorney's
client.").
23 Note, DR 7-104 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Applied to the Gov-
ernment "Party," 61 MINN. L. REV. 1007, 1010 (1977), cited in Wright, 691 P.2d at 567.
gee also WOLFRAM, supra note 17, § 11.6.2, at 613 ("[one] objective of the anticontact
rule is to prevent improvident settlements").
24 Kurlantzik, supra note 19, at 145-46.
2" Id. at 148-49.
26 Id. at 152.
27 See City of N.Y. Bar Ass'n, Op. 80-46 (1982) (arguing that the principal thrust of
the Rule is to protect a party's right to effective representation by enabling the attorney
to "aid his client both to avoid procedural pitfalls and to present truthful statements in
the most favorable manner") quoted in Krulewitch, supra note 3, at 1277-78.
28 See George B. Wyeth, Talking to the Other Side's Employees and Ex-Employ-
ees, 15 LITIG. 10 (1989) ("The courts allow ex parte contacts partly to avoid the expense
of using formal discovery .... Even more important ... is the practical fact that an
employee-witness will be far more forthcoming in an informal interview than in a formal
[Vol. 57:953
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the United States Supreme Court implicitly recognized in Hick-
man v. Taylor, proper preparation of a client's case demands
that an attorney assemble and utilize any and all relevant infor-
mation that may be available.29 "The historical and necessary
way in which lawyers act within the framework of our system of
jurisprudence to promote justice and to protect their clients' in-
terests . .. is reflected in [a lawyer's] interviews, statements,
memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, per-
sonal beliefs, and countless other tangible and intangible ways..
..,,:1 Indeed, the Code mandates that a lawyer do all she can to
represent a client "zealously within the bounds of the law."31
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit has noted, an attorney's right to interview witnesses is a
"time-honored and decision-honored principle[]. ' 2 Ex parte in-
terviews are a critical tool in an attorney's quest for truth, which
may outweigh possible burdens or dangers to the opposing
party.3 3 In fact, interviews are an integral part of the pre-trial
investigation that an attorney has an affirmative duty to con-
duct.3 4 This inexpensive discovery device is especially important
deposition in the presence of the company's lawyer, and possibly company manage-
ment."); see also Niesig, 76 N.Y.2d at 372, 558 N.E.2d at 1034, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 497
("Costly formal depositions that may deter litigants.., are no substitute for such off-
the-record private efforts to learn and assemble, rather than perpetuate, information.").
29 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (establishing the "work-product" doctrine: an opposing party
cannot discover information obtained by an attorney while preparing for litigation, ab-
sent a showing of need).
10 Id. at 511.
"1 CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsmIrry Canon 7 N.Y. Jud. Law App. (McKinney
Supp. 1991). The corresponding Disciplinary Rule 7-101 explicitly states:
A. A lawyer shall not intentionally.
1. Fail to seek the lawful objectives of the client through reasonably available
means permitted by law and the Disciplinary Rules ....
Id. (emphasis added).
31 International Business Mach. v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d 37, 42 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding
that trial court's restrictions on a party's right to interview adverse witnesses exceeded
its authority, since it impaired the constitutional right of parties to effective representa-
tion and was contrary to the principle that counsel has a right to interview an adverse
party's witnesses privately without the presence of opposing counsel and without a tran-
script being made).
Frey v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 106 F.R.D. 32, 36 (E.D.N.Y.
1985) (in a sex discrimination suit brought by an employee denied a promotion against
her employer, holding that plaintiff had a right to contact other employees on an ex
parte basis because "on balance, the proposed questioning sought by plaintiff [wouldj aid
in the search for truth").
" Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 requires that an attorney sign all pleadings,
1991]
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where a plaintiff of limited means seeks to bring a civil rights
suit, 5 or where a plaintiff seeks to sue an employer for employ-
ment discrimination or for injuries suffered on account of work-
ing conditions s.3  Barring a plaintiff's access to a potentially vast
number of witnesses who might have direct knowledge of corpo-
rate practices or facts relevant to a plaintiff's case, outside of
costly discovery procedures, "may well frustrate the right of an
individual plaintiff with limited resources to a fair trial and de-
ter other litigants from pursuing their legal remedies. ''
3
7
In civil cases involving individuals, application of the Rule
is plain-the term "party" refers to individuals, not to their
agents and employees.3 s However, application of the Rule be-
comes more difficult when a business entity becomes involved in
a lawsuit. In litigation the corporate entity is the named party,
not the employees or agents;39 on the other hand, companies act
motions or other papers that "to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and
belief formed after reasonable inquiry ... is well-grounded in fact and is warranted by
existing law .... FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (emphasis added). To establish that a claim has
merit, an attorney will often need to consult not only her client but also witnesses who
may provide important relevant factual information. Interviews are the most efficient
tool available to attorneys for this purpose.
11 As the United States Supreme Court recognized in New York Gaslight Club v.
Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 63 (1980), "one of Congress' primary purposes in enacting [Title VII)
was to 'make it easier for a plaintiff of limited means to bring a meritorious suit.'"
(quoting 110-CONG. REC. 12724 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)).
" See, e.g., NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 240 (1978):
The danger of witness intimidation is particularly acute with respect to current
employees-whether rank and file, supervisory, or managerial-over whom the
employer, by virtue of the employment relationship, may exercise intense lev-
erage. Not only can the employer fire the employee, but job assignments can be
switched, hours can be adjusted, wage and salary increases held up, and other
more subtle forms of influence exerted.
11 Frey, 106 F.R.D. at 36 (citing Leubsdorf, supra note 19).
The costs of an informal interview pale in comparison to the costs of conducting a
deposition or other interview with counsel present, since they require the presence of the
opposing party's attorney and generally a court reporter. Such costs may effectively pro-
hibit a complainant from pursuing a lawsuit. See Krulewitch, supra note 3, at 1283-84
(Although the broad objectives of ex parte interviews can be achieved through a formal
deposition, the costs of achieving those objectives will far exceed the costs of informal
interviews.); Shealy v. Laidlaw Bros., Inc., 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1223, 1225 n.1
(D.S.C. 1984) (the advantages of this informal discovery are numerous and "serve the
public interest by streamlining litigation and reducing litigation costs").
" Niesig, 76 N.Y.2d at 370, 558 N.E.2d at 1033, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 496.
39 Id. See N.Y. CONST. art. X, § 4 ("And all corporations shall have the right to sue
and shall be subject to be sued in all courts in like cases as natural persons."); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 202(a)(2) (McKinney 1987) ("Each corporation . . .shall have power in
furtherance of its corporate purposes: To sue and be sued in all courts ... .
[Vol. 57: 953
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solely through natural persons, and unless some of their employ-
ees or agents are also considered parties, business entities are
effectively read out of the Rule.40 Thus, considering that the eth-
ical provisions in the Code apply equally to individual and to
corporate parties, some employees of the corporation must be
covered by the Rule.41 The problem arises, however, in deter-
mining which corporate employees should be deemed parties for
purposes of DR 7-104(A)(1). The Rule, itself, does not define the
term "party" and courts have failed to adopt a uniform defini-
tion of the term. Balancing the Rule's conflicting goals of protec-
tion for parties against their need for informal, inexpensive ac-
cess to information, courts, bar associations and commentators
have developed different tests to determine the definition of the
corporate "party."
B. Facts
In 1986 the plaintiff, a construction worker, fell from a scaf-
fold at a building site and was injured. The plaintiff commenced
an action for damages against defendants J.M. Frederick Con-
struction of New York, Inc., the general contractor on the site,
and Team I, the property owner.42 The defendants impleaded
DeTrae Enterprises, Inc., plaintiff's employer and the subcon-
tractor at the site, as a third-party defendant.
During the course of pretrial discovery, the plaintiff served
defendant DeTrae with written interrogatories to which the de-
fendant failed to respond. The plaintiff then moved to compel
DeTrae to reveal the names and addresses of all employees pre-
40 Niesig, 76 N.Y.2d at 370, 558 N.E.2d at 1033, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 496. See also
Hasenfratz v. Berger Apartments, 61 N.Y.S.2d 12, 15 (1946) (an executive officer of a
corporation is not merely an agent, but the alter ego of the corporation, so that an act
within the scope of his authority is generally considered an act of the corporation); 19
C.J.S. Corporations § 586 (1990) ("The agent of a corporation stands in place of the
corporation itself in the line of his assigned duties, and acts within his authorized em-
ployment are the acts of the corporation, even if the acts are committed without the
knowledge of the officers of the corporation.").
Niesig, 76 N.Y.2d at 370, 558 N.E.2d at 1033, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 496; see also Ste-
phen A. Saltzburg, Corporate and Related Attorney-Client Privilege Claims: A Sug-
gested Approach, 12 HOFsrRA L. REv. 279 (1984) (discussing rationale for attorney-client
privilege and reasons corporations are entitled to same protections as natural persons).
4" The facts are recounted in both the appellate division and court of appeals opin-
ions. 149 A.D.2d at 96, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 154; 76 N.Y.2d at 367-68, 558 N.E.2d at 1031-32,
559 N.Y.S.2d at 494-95.
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sent at the site at the time of the incident. He also sought au-
thorization for his counsel to contact these individuals on an ex
parte basis, arguing that such ex parte contact was permissible
since these employees were neither "managerial" nor "control-
ling" members of the corporation.
Defendant DeTrae opposed the motion on the ground that
DR 7-104(A)(1) barred unauthorized contacts by plaintiff's law-
yer with any of its employees. The New York Supreme Court,
Nassau County, denied plaintiff's motion and imposed an abso-
lute ban on ex parte communication with witnesses employed by
defendant DeTrae. The court gave no reason and cited no au-
thority for its prohibition on ex parte contacts.43 In an interlocu-
tory appeal the plaintiff argued that the supreme court's rulings
were erroneous as a matter of law and that the court had abused
its discretion in denying its requests to conduct discovery.
44
C. The Appellate Division Decision
The New York Appellate Division, Second Department con-
sidered the issue on appeal. Interpreting DR 7-104(A)(1)
broadly, the court found that "all present employees of a corpo-
ration" are "parties" for purposes of the Rule.4 5 Thus, the court
denied plaintiff's attorneys any informal access to DeTrae's cur-
rent employees.46
To determine the scope of the Rule where the party is a
corporation, the court placed great emphasis on Upjohn Co. v.
United States, the United States Supreme Court decision in
which the Court addressed the scope of the attorney-client privi-
lege in the corporate setting.47 In addition, the court cited as au-
thority New York's own statutory attorney-client privilege,48 dis-
4' Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 8, Niesig v. Team 1, 76 N.Y.2d 363, 558 N.E.2d
1030, 559 N.Y.S.2d 493 (1990).
44 Id. at 9.
41 149 A.D.2d at 106, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 159.
46 The court modified the supreme court's order so far as it applied to former De-
Trae employees, stating in dicta that DR 7-104(A)(1) does not apply to former corporate
employees. 149 A.D.2d at 99, 100 n.1, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 155, 156 n.1.
47 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (in an action by a corporation contesting an order to produce
certain documents prepared by employees for corporate counsel, holding that communi-
cations by a corporation's employees, including low- and mid-level employees, with cor-
porate counsel are protected by the attorney-client privilege).




covery rules,'9 and common law hearsay exception. 0
The .appellate division linked the plaintiff's request to con-
duct ex parte interviews with those corporate employees who
were not alter egos of the corporation with an assumption on the
part of the plaintiff that the attorney who represented the cor-
poration did not represent its employees."1 In response, the
court pointed out that the Supreme Court held in Upjohn that
the attorney-client privilege protects information obtained by
corporate attorneys from employees at every level of the
corporation.
52
In Upjohn the corporation's general counsel had solicited
confidential information from various employees in connection
with an internal investigation into "questionable payments"
made to foreign governments. 53 The Internal Revenue Service
sought to compel the production of this information, but Upjohn
refused, arguing that such communications were protected under
the attorney-client privilege.5 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit held that only communications be-
tween counsel and the corporation's "control group" were privi-
leged, that is, communications between counsel and those
"officers and agents.., responsible for directing [the company's]
actions in response to legal advice."5
The Supreme Court, however, rejected the control group
test, arguing that its narrow scope frustrated the purposes of the
privilege in three respects.56 First, the test inhibited communica-
"I Scope of Disclosure, N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L & H. § 3101(a)(1) (McKinney 1990)
("There shall be full disclosure of all evidence material and necessary in the prosecution
or defense of an action, regardless of the burden of proof, by. (1) a party, or the officer,
director, member, agent or employee of a party.").
' See notes 68-70 and accompanying text infra.
149 A.D.2d at 100, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 156 ("The plaintiff assumes, in other words,
that DeTrae's attorneys have no attorney-client relationship with the employees of De-
Trae whom the plaintiff seeks to interview.").
5'2 Id. ("It is clear... that any agent of DeTrae could avail himself of the attorney-
client privilege with respect to communications made by him to DeTrae's attorneys on
the subject matter of this litigation .... This was the essential holding of the Supreme
Court in Upjohn Co. v. United States.").
53 449 U.S. at 386.
5' Id. at 388.
55 Id.
" Id. at 392-93; see also Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Corporate
Client: Where Do We Go After Upjohn?, 81 Micm L REv. 665 (1983) (rejecting the vari-




tions between corporate counsel and mid- and low-level employ-
ees by denying them the protection of the privilege:
Middle-level-and indeed lower-level-employees can, by actions
within the scope of their employment, embroil the corporation in seri-
ous legal difficulties, and it is only natural that these employees would
have the relevant information needed by corporate counsel if he is
adequately to advise the client with respect to such actual or potential
difficulties.57
Second, this narrow approach frustrated attorneys' efforts to en-
sure the corporation's compliance with regulatory law which fre-
quently involves lower level employees for implementation. 8
Third, the uncertainty and unpredictability of this test inhibited
communications between corporate employees and attorneys.",
Thus the Court held that the attorney-client privilege ex-
tended to communications made by corporate employees to cor-
porate counsel in connection with a pending investigation but
made clear that its decision was narrowly confined to the case
before it.60 The Court also pointed out in dicta that the privilege
only protects disclosure of communications; "it does not protect
disclosure of the underlying facts by those who communicated
with the attorney." 1 The Court thereby acknowledged an attor-
ney's right to conduct necessary discovery. The appellate divi-
sion argued that Upjohn defines the scope of the common law
"' Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 391 (citing Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F,2d 596 (8th
Cir. 1978)).
" Id. at 392 ("The narrow scope given the attorney-client privilege by the court
below ... threatens to limit the valuable efforts of corporate counsel to ensure their
client's compliance with the law.").
11 Id. at 393 ("An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but re-
suIts in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at
all.").
"o Id. at 396 ("[W]e decide only the case before us, and do not undertake to draft a
set of rules which should govern challenges to investigatory subpoenas. Any such ap-
proach would violate the spirit of Federal Rule of Evidence 501.").
"' Id. at 395. The Court further stated:
[T]he protection of the privilege extends only to communications and not to
facts. A fact is one thing and a communication concerning that fact is an en-
tirely different thing. The client cannot be compelled to answer the question,
'What did you say or write to the attorney?' but may not refuse to disclose any
relevant fact within his knowledge merely because he incorporated a statement
of such fact into his communication to his attorney.




attorney-client privilege adopted in New York by statute.2 The
court reasoned that this attorney-client relationship extended
between DeTrae's attorneys and all current DeTrae employees
who were connected in any way with the subject of the litiga-
tion.63 Thus the court concluded that since there was an attor-
ney-client relationship with all corporate employees, all DeTrae
employees were clients and, therefore, parties to the litigation."
Accordingly, the court denied plaintiff's request to conduct ex
parte interviews with any DeTrae employees, stating that "the
terms of DR 7-104(A)(1) may effectively be enforced 'only by
viewing all present employees of a corporation as parties.' ,,0
02 149 A.D.2d at 101, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 156. See N.Y. Crv. PRAtC L & R. 4503(a) (Mc-
Kinney 1991) which provides:
Unless the client waives the privilege, an attorney or his employee, or any per-
son who obtains without the knowledge of the client evidence of a confidential
communication made between the attorney or his employee and the client in
the course of professional employment, shall not disclose, or be allowed to dis-
close such communication ... in any action.
Note that Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence sets forth a general rule that,
with certain exceptions, evidentiary privileges shall be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in light of
reason and experience. FED. IL EvD. 501. However, Rule 501 also provides for the deter-
mination of privilege questions in accordance with state law in civil actions for elements
of a claim or defense where state law supplies the rule of decision. Bruce L McDaniel,
Annotation, Situations in Which Federal Courts are Governed by State Law of Privi-
lege Under Rule 501 of Federal Rules of Evidence, 48 A.L.R. Fmn 259 § 2(a) (1986).
63 149 A.D.2d at 99-100, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 156.
-, 149 A.D.2d at 101, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 157. One commentator has argued that this
reasoning by the court is specious. Robert A. Barker, An Interview with the Adversary
Party, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 22, 1990, at 3 ('Since attorneys can only have protected communi-
cations with clients, goes this syllogism, it follows that all the employees must be clients
and hence, in litigation, parties."). The problem with the court's applying Upjohn to the
situation in Ni~sig is that a "corporate employee who is a 'client' under the attorney-
client privilege is not necessarily a 'party' for purposes of the disciplinary rule." Wright
v. Group Health, Hosp., 691 P.2d 564, 570 (Wash. 1984). Although both the attorney-
client privilege and the disciplinary rules aim to further the attorney-client relationship,
the policies behind these two rules are different. Id.; see also Niesig, 76 N.Y.2d at 371-
72, 558 N.E.2d at 1034, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 497. In the corporate context the attorney-client
privilege serves to promote open communication between employees and corporate coun-
sel. In contrast, Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A)(1) exists to protect the corporate entity
against unscrupulous practices of adversary counsel.
Furthermore, the plaintiff's attorney in Niesig did not seek to discover communica-
tions regarding the accident between DeTrae employees and corporate counsel that were
protected by the attorney-client privilege. Rather, the attorney sought to interview De-
Trae employees to discover the underlying facts that according to the Upjohn court are
exempt from the attorney-client privilege. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
Id. at 106, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 159 (quoting City of N.Y. Bar Ass'n, Op. 80.46 (1982)).
The court's reliance on this opinion was misplaced. The Association did not advocate a
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Finally, the court rejected the alter ego standard advocated
by the plaintiff as immensely impractical 6 and theoretically de-
ficient.6 7 In particular, the court argued that the alter ego stan-
dard, which distinguishes corporate employees according to the
evidentiary question of whether the employee can "speak for" or
"bind" the company,68 runs afoul of New York's evidence rule,
which differs from that of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 801(d) (2) (D) provides that out-of-court
statements made by an employee concerning a matter within the
scope of employment are admissible against the corporation as
admissions.6 9 Under this hearsay rule, out-of-court statements
ban on all ex parte communications with corporate employees; rather, it adopted the far
narrower scope of employment test which prohibits attorneys from interviewing any em-
ployees about matters that relate to the scope of their employment. Thus the court's
placing a blanket ban on ex parte interviews cannot be justified by the reasoning in
Upjohn or Opinion 80-46.
66 The plaintiff has offered no concrete standard by which the courts could dis-
tinguish, in a consistent manner, between the type of corporate employees with
respect to whom ex parte contact by adverse counsel would be forbidden, on
the one hand, and the type of corporate emplbyees with respect to whom such
contact would be allowed, on the other.
149 A.D.2d at 102, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 157.
67 Id.
"' The alter ego standard derives from the law of evidence and agency. Niesig, 76
N.Y.2d at 375, 558 N.E.2d at 1036, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 499. In a 1978 Informal Opinion
regarding DR 7-104(A)(1) the ABA employed principles of evidence and agency to con-
struct a workable definition of the corporate party. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1410 (1978) ("If the officers and employees that you
propose to interview could commit the corporation because of their authority as corpo-
rate officers or employees or for some other reason the law cloaks them with authority,
then they, as the alter egos of the corporation, are parties for purposes of DR 7-
104(A)(1).") This position has received support from commentators, including one ethics
expert who has stated that attorneys should be prohibited from ex parte contact with
those "who have the legal power to bind the corporation in the matter or who are re-
sponsible for implementing the advice of the corporation's lawyer." WOLFRAM, supra
note 17, § 11.6.2 at 613.
The use of evidentiary principles in this definition appears to stem from concern
that, because an employee's out-of-court statements concerning matters within the scope
of employment may be admissible against the corporation as admissions, the corporation
risks undue exposure from ex parte contacts. See Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 691
P.2d 564, 569 (Wash. 1984) ("It is not the purpose of the rule to protect a corporate
party from the revelation of prejudicial facts .... Rather, the rule's function is to pre-
clude the interviewing of those corporate employees who have the authority to bind the
corporation.").
66 Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D) provides that "[a] statement is not hearsay
if ... [tihe statement is offered against a party and is ... a statement by the party's
agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency of employment,
made during the existence of the relationship." FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(D).
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by a broad range of employees may be used as admissions
against the corporation and correspondingly in the context of
DR 7-104(A)(1), a broad range of employees will be off-limits to
ex parte contacts. However, under New York evidence law, an
employee's statement is admissible "only if the making of the
statement is an activity within the scope of his authority."70
Since generally few corporate employees are authorized by the
corporation to speak, few employees will be considered parties
under the New York rule and the corporate defendant will be
unduly exposed to opposing counsel.
Thus the appellate court determined that New York's nar-
row hearsay exception does not provide adequate guidance in
determining whether an employee constitutes an alter ego of the
corporation, and allowing such contacts with agents or employ-
ees would result in the "granting of a virtual carte blanche to
conduct ex parte interviews with the employees of institutional
defendants under almost any circumstance. 11'  The court also
criticized the argument advanced by the plaintiff that public
policy considerations required that his attorney be able to con-
duct ex parte interviews with the defendant's current employees
as a matter of "personal expedience.
''
72
D. The Court of Appeals Decision
The court of appeals modified the appellate division's order
to permit ex parte communications by the plaintiff's attorney
1o It is the long-settled law of this State that an oral or written statement made
by an agent may be received in evidence against his principal under the admis-
sions exception to the hearsay rule only if it was spoken or written within the
scope of authority of the agent to speak or write for his employer.
Loschiavo v. Port Auth. of New York and New Jersey, 86 A.D.2d 624, 625, 446 N.Y.S.2d
358, 359 (1982).
71 149 A.D.2d at 104, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 158. But see the court of appeals' opinion in
which the court points out that "[i]nformal encounters between a lawyer and an em-
ployee-witness are not-as a blanket ban assumes-invariably calculated to elicit unwit-
ting admissions; [rather,] they serve long-recognized values in the litigation process." 76
N.Y.2d at 372-73, 558 N.E.2d at 1034, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 497.
149 A.D.2d at 106, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 159-60. The court stated that the "real inter-
ests" which the plaintiff sought to advance were financial (i.e., ex parte interviews are
less expensive than depositions) and tactical (i.e., witnesses may be more forthcoming
and therefore more apt to present prejudicial information if counsel is not present) and
argued that the plaintiff's "search for the truth" could be accomplished by means of
regular pre-trial depositions. However, financial and tactical benefits are among the in-
terests that the Rule is meant to promote. See notes 18-37 and accompanying text supra.
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with all current DeTrae employees who were not "alter egos" of
the corporation. The court determined that the "alter ego" test
is the most "workable" solution to the dilemma facing attorneys
who must interpret the Rule's ban on ex parte contacts with cor-
porate parties.
7 3
The court .prefaced its analysis by noting that the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which is not a statute, does not have
the force of law.74 Therefore, the court stated it was not bound
to read the rules literally or achieve the intent of the drafters,
but was required only to "look to the rules as guidelines to be
applied with due regard for the broad range of interests at
stake. ' 75 Where there is uncertainty, the court emphasized it
must use the "judicial process" to make its decision. This fact is
significant because it permitted the court to adopt the alter ego
standard largely on public policy grounds.7 6 However, the court
did buttress its opinion with references to case law and interpre-
tive commentary surrounding the test, as well as "developed
11 This test "minimiz[es] the uncertainty facing lawyers about to embark on em-
ployee interviews." 76 N.Y.2d at 375, 558 N.E.2d at 1036, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 499.
11 "Approved by the New York State Bar Association and then enacted by the Ap-
pellate Divisions, the Code of Professional Responsibility is essentially the legal profes-
sion's document of self-governance, embodying principles of ethical conduct for attor-
neys as well as rules for professional discipline." 76 N.Y.2d at 369, 558 N.E.2d at 1032,
559 NY.S.2d at 495 (citing CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, N.Y. JuD. LAW App.
(McKinney Supp. 1991) (Preliminary Statement)).
11 76 N.Y.2d at 369-70, 558 N.E.2d at 1032, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 495. The court recog-
nized its role as follows:
When we agree that the Code'applies in an equitable manner to a matter
before us, we should not hesitate to enforce it with vigor. When we find an area
of uncertainty, however, we must use our judicial process to make our own
decision in the interests of justice to all concerned.
Id. (quoting Foley & Co. v. Vanderbilt, 523 F.2d 1357, 1360 (2d Cir. 1975) (an appeal
from an order of the district court denying defendant's motion to disqualify plaintiffs'
law firm from further representation in the case due to various improprieties)). See also
Niesig, 76 N.Y.2d at 378, 558 N.E.2d at 1038, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 501 (Bellacosa, J., concur-
ring) ("We are free to make a policy choice somewhat on a tabula rasa, save for the
guidance only of the specialized Code of Professional Responsibility, not some broad
public policy legislative enactment."). See also CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
N.Y. Jun. LAW App. (McKinney Supp. 1991) (Preliminary Statement) ("[AJn enforcing
agency, in applying the Disqiplinary Rules, may find interpretive guidance in the basic
principles embodied in thd Canons and in the objectives reflected in the Ethical
Considerations.").
76 76 N.Y.2d at 368, 559 N.E.2d at 1031, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 494 ("The trial court and
the Appellate Division both [found] that an employee of a counseled corporate party in
litigation is by definition also a 'party' within the rule, and prohibited the interviews. For
reasons of policy, we disagree.").
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concepts of the law of evidence and the law of agency.' '7
First, the-court discussed the policies that inform the Rule
and emphasized that DR 7-104(A)(1) "prevent[s] situations in
,which a represented party may be taken advantage of by adverse
counsel" and thereby "safeguards against clients making im-
provident settlements, ill-advised disclosures and unwarranted
concessions. Acknowledging that the fundamental principle
behind the Rule is "fairness," the court went on to identify the
importance of informal discovery methods to advance the litiga-
tion process and to promote the efficient resolution of disputes.
70
Next the court reviewed the different tests courts have used
to determine the scope of the corporate "party" and rejected
each of them based on their intrinsic deficiencies.80 In particular,
the court repudiated the appellate division's adoption of the
broad blanket ban standard and criticized its reliance on
Upjohn as inapposite."' While the court recognized the clarity
and certainty inherent in a test that equates a corporate "party"
with all of its employees, the court argued that the blanket rule
exacted too high a price in closing off all avenues of informal
discovery.8 2 As the court noted, "The broader the definition of
'party' in the interests of fairness to the corporation, the greater
77 76 N.Y.2d at 375, 558 N.E.2d at 1036, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 499 (citing as examples
decisions from state or district courts in Illinois, Kansas, Montana, New York, South
Carolina, and Washington, as well as commentaries spanning over ten years). See, e.g.,
Krulewitch, supra note 3; Samuel R. Miller & Angelo J. Calfo, Ex parte Contact with
Employees and Former Employees of a Corporate Aduersary: Is It Ethical?, 42 Bus.
LAw. 1053 (1987); Louis A. Stahl, Ex Parte Interviews with Enterprise Employees: A
Post-Upjohn Analysis, 44 WASH. & LEE L RLv. 1181, 1196 (1987); Wyeth, supra note 28.
'8 76 N.Y.2d at 370, 558 N.E.2d at 1032-33, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 495-96.
79 Id. (citing ABA Canons of Professional Ethics). See note 18 supra.
80 The court dismissed the blanket rule (because it "exacts a high price ... [by]
clos[ing] off avenues of informal discovery of information"), the control group test (since
it "wholly overlooks the fact that corporate employees other than senior management
also can bind the corporation"), the case-by-case balancing test and the scope of employ-
ment test ("they give too little guidance or otherwise seem unworkable"), in favor of the
alter ego standard. 76 N.Y.2d at 372-74, 558 N.E.2d at 1034-35, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 497-98.
8 Upjohn... addresses an entirely different subject, [the attorney-client privi-
lege,] with policy objectives that have little relation to the question whether a
corporate employee should be considered a 'party' for purposes of the discipli-
nary rule .... [A] corporate employee who may be a 'client' for purposes of the
attorney-client privilege is not necessarily a "party" for purposes of DR 7-
104(A)(1).
76 N.Y.2d at 371-72, 558 N.E.2d at 1034, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 497. See also note 64 supra.
.2 76 N.Y.2d at 372, 558 N.E.2d at 1034, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 497. See also notes 95-102
and accompanying text infra.
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the cost in terms of foreclosing vital informal access to facts."8 3
Finally, the court adopted a modified version of the alter
ego test developed by the American Bar Association." The court
defined "party" for purposes of DR 7-104(A)(1) to include those
corporate employees "whose acts or omissions in the matter
under inquiry are binding on the corporation.., or imputed to
the corporation for purposes of its liability, or [who are] imple-
menting the advice of counsel."8 5 The court argued that its alter
ego test is the fairest gauge for determining the scope of a corpo-
rate party for purposes of the Rule because it equitably balances
the parties' competing interests in protection and access to un-
derlying facts.88 The court also asserted that the alter ego test
negates the potential unfair advantage of extracting admissions
from those who will bind the corporation; it upholds the impor-
tant attorney-client privilege; it permits direct access to employ-
ees who were witnesses to an event; and it is clear and predict-
able in application since it relies on developed standards of the
law of evidence and the law of agency. 7 In addition to these
strong policy arguments, the court supported its espousal of the
alter ego test by noting that a similar test had been "overwhelm-
ingly adopted by courts and bar associations throughout the
country" and had enjoyed successful practical application. 8
8 76 N.Y.2d at 371, 558 N.E.2d at 1033, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 496.
, The alter ego approach was described by the ABA in a 1978 Informal Opinion.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1410 (1978). See
note 68 supra.
85 76 N.Y.2d at 374, 558 N.E.2d at 1035, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 498.
Courts that have adopted the alter ego test have tended to employ the ABA's defini-
tion of the corporate "party," that is, those employees having legal authority to "speak
for" or "bind" the corporation. In contrast, the test adopted by the Niesig court is more
stringent and prohibits ex parte contacts with a wider range of corporate employees. See
notes 135-42 and accompanying text infra.
8' 76 N.Y.2d at 374, 558 N.E.2d at 1035, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 498.
87 Id.
88 76 N.Y.2d at 375, 558 N.E.2d at 1036, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 499. Cases cited include
Chancellor v. Boeing Co., 678 F. Supp. 250 (D. Kan. 1988) (in an action against employer
involving promotion denials, court held that plaintiff was prohibited from interviewing
informally those employees who might have been involved in the issue such that their
actions could be imputed to the corporation for purposes of civil liability); Frey v. De-
partment of Health and Human Servs., 106 F.R.D. 32 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (in a sex discrimi-
nation suit, court found that plaintiff could contact corporate employees, except those
high-level managerial employees who participated in decision not to promote plaintiff);
Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 691 P.2d 564 (Wash. 1984) (in a medical malpractice
action, court held that plaintiffs had a right to conduct ex parte interviews with those




A. Different Tests for Interpreting DR 7-104(A)(1)
Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A)(1) mandates that a lawyer not
"communicate on the subject of-the representation with a party
he knows to be represented by a lawyer." Unfortunately, the am-
biguity of the term "party" has made it difficult for lawyers to
determine the ethical limit of ex parte interviews when the op-
posing party is a business entity.89 Consequently, a lawyer may
be confronted with an ethical dilemma when faced with the op-
portunity to conduct an ex parte interview with another party's
employeeY' On one hand she must comply with the Code's com-
mand to represent one's client zealously; on the other hand she
must be careful not to violate the Rule's injunction since a viola-
tion could result in sanctions or even disqualification.91
Courts and bar associations have attempted to reconcile the
problem of interpreting the scope of a corporate "party" by for-
mulating a number of tests that balance the various policy inter-
ests informing the Rule.92 Generally, they have weighed such sig-
nificant factors as the need for discovery, protection of
them the right to speak for and bind corporation). See also ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual
on Professional Conduct 71:03 (1984) (officers and directors with power to bind the cor-
poration tend to be considered parties).
Bar association opinions cited include Alabama State Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. RO-83-
81 (1983); Colorado Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 69 (1985); Virginia State Bar, Legal Ethics Op.
905 (1987).
9 Krulewitch, supra note 3, at 1275 ("Attorneys opposing corporate parties have no
standard to determine which employees or agents of the corporation they may interview
ex parte."); see also In re FMC Corp., 430 F. Supp. 1108, 1110 (S.DAV.Va. 1977) ("When
applied . . . to a corporation, no objective standard usable for all cases is readily
available.").
90 Stahl, supra note 77, at 1184-85 (criticizing the ambiguities in the Code and argu-
ing for more careful analysis from courts and bar associations in defining parties and
witnesses). Other commentators have criticized the vagueness and ambiguity in the
Code. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Legal Ethics: Legal Rules and Professional As-
pirations, 30 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 571 (1981); Panel Discussion, 35 U. M1ma L. RE. 669
(1981) (cited in Stahl, supra note 77, at 1184 n.13). See also Leubsdorf, supra note 19, at
688-93 (arguing that the Rule actually harms the client by providing attorneys with over-
expansive authority to control all communications with the opposing party).
91 Note that the client suffers, too, when her lawyer is disqualified for improperly
contacting a witness.
92 See generally Hodson, supra note 7. Unfortunately, the courts and bar associa-
tions that have considered the problem have failed to establish a uniform standard.
Krulewitch, supra note 3, at 1275 (courts "have failed to resolve the confusion").
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vulnerable parties, predictability and judicial efficiency in devel-
oping a standard that can be used to fulfill the Rule's objec-
tives.9 3 While a test may accomplish one important goal of the
Rule, for example, a party's need to conduct discovery, the test
will ultimately fail if it unduly hampers other policies, for exam-
ple, protection of the corporate party.9 4 This section of the Com-
ment surveys the different tests that have been used to deter-
mine the scope of the corporate "party" in light of the goals of
DR 7-104(A)(1).
1. The Blanket Ban Test
The "blanket ban" test equates a corporate "party" with all
employees of the corporation, and thereby prohibits attorneys
from interviewing any employees of a corporation informally.,
In practice, the blanket test places all employees off-limits to
informal questioning by an adversary's attorney, even where the
employees were merely witnesses to an event relevant to the liti-
9' See notes 18-37 and accompanying text supra.
"' Krulewitch, supra note 3, at 1278.
" There is a dearth of judicial support for this test. Courts that have adopted the
blanket ban test include, Niesig, 149 A.D.2d 94, 545 N.Y.S.2d 153 (2d Dep't 1989); Cag-
guila v. Wyeth Labs., 127 F.R.D. 653 (E.D.Pa. 1989) (Court relied expressly on lower
court decision in Niesig in granting defendant's motion to prohibit use of corporate em-
ployee's statement by interpreting Model Rule 4.2 to prohibit ex parte contact with
nonmanagerial employee despite the explicit definition of Model Rule 4.2. See note 17
supra.); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Superior Court of Orange County, 252 Cal. Rptr. 14
(Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (depublished) (in a suit for defamation by employee against em-
ployer, court upheld the blanket ban test but denied disqualification of opposing counsel
who contacted employees on ex parte basis and discussed facts of case) (for a discussion
of the significance of depublication, see note 102 infra); Mills Land and Water Co. v.
Golden West Ref. Co., 230 Cal. Rptr. 461 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (where corporation sought
disqualification of opposing counsel who directly contacted corporate director, court held
that disqualification was proper, even though director was not a member of control
group).
Three bar associations and one commentator have advocated the blanket rule. See
Comm. on Professional Ethics, Bar Ass'n of Nassau County, Op. 2-89 (1989) ("[direct
contact with employees of an adverse corporate party is prohibited when the corporation
is represented by counsel"); Los Angeles County Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal
Ethics Op. 410 (1983) (arguing that adoption of this bright-line rule promotes confidenti-
ality of corporate counsel's advice and insures that opposing counsel do not have im-
proper contact with the opposing party) cited in Stahl, supra note 77, at 1208-11; New
York County Lawyers' Ass'n, Op. 528 (1964) ("The fact that the corporation and its
current employees are represented by counsel is sufficient to protect them from interfer-
ence or contact by opposing counsel."); see also Miller & Calfo, supra note 77 (recom-
mending the recognition of a clear rule forbidding ex parte contacts concerning a subject
of controversy with current employees of a corporate party).
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gation. The benefit of such a test is its absolute clarity 0e As
noted by the court of appeals in Niesig, "No lawyer need ever
risk disqualification or discipline because of uncertainty as to
which employees are covered by the rule and which not. 9 7 In
addition, the test provides substantial protection for a corporate
party that, because of its large size and decentralized nature,
risks having its employees improperly contacted by opposing
counsel.
Nevertheless, this extremely broad definition of "party" has
been generally disfavored by courts and bar associations because
it places a premium on protecting the corporate party at the
high cost of foreclosing the adversary party's ability to obtain
valuable information efficiently.9 8 Reliance on this bright-line
test is contrary to the strong policy mandating that an attorney
do all she can, by investigating a claim and conducting discov-
ery, to represent a client zealously.9 The blanket rule is unduly
restrictive in that it closes off avenues of informal discovery
which promote "the expeditious resolution of disputes" and thus
forces attorneys to conduct investigations by means of expensive
depositions.100 As such, it abrogates an important policy under-
lying DR 7-104(A)(1): to foster resolution of disputes.
The appellate division in Niesig adopted the blanket ban
rule based mainly on its reading of the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the corporate party for purposes of the attorney-
client privilege in Upjohn Co. v. United States and on its view
of New York evidentiary principles. 101 In addition, the court
cited opinions by the California Court of Appeals as persuasive
authority.102 However, the court's rationale for its adoption of
Niesig, 76 N.Y.2d at 372, 558 N.E.2d at 1034, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 497.
97 Id.
98 Id.
" Canon 7 of the Code requires that a lawyer "represent a client zealously within
the bounds of the law." CODE OF PROFESSiONAL REsPONSMILrry Canon 7 N.Y. JUD, LAW
App. (McKinney Supp. 1991). See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
oI Niesig, 76 N.Y.2d at 372, 558 N.E.2d at 1034, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 497; see also text
accompanying notes 32-37 supra.
oI See notes 45-72 and accompanying text supra.
102 See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Superior Court of Orange County, 252 Cal. Rptr. 14
(Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (depublished); Mills Land and Water Co. v. Golden West Ref. Co.,
230 Cal. Rptr. 461 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). In fact, the California Supreme Court "depub-
lished" the more recent court of appeals opinion at about the same time the State Bar of
California approved a new rule that allows attorneys to interview most routine fact wit-
nesses on an ex parte basis. The significance of "depublication" has been explained by an
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the blanket rule is faulty: the court not only misread Upjohn
and the California cases, but it also failed to give adequate
weight to the important policies that underlie the Rule. The
blanket ban test embraced by the appellate division is overly in-
jurious to an attorney's ability to investigate and conduct dis-
covery in developing a theory and defense of a client's case.
2. The Case-by-Case Balancing Test
In the "case-by-case balancing" test the parties' competing
interests are weighed and a balance is sought between the attor-
ney's ability to discover the facts of the case and the corpora-
tion's interest in protecting itself.20 3 For example, whether a
court will permit ex parte contacts with a truck driver-employee
Associate Justice of the California Supreme Court in Joseph R. Grodin, The Depublica-
tion Practice of the California Supreme Court, 72 CAL. L. REV. 514 (1984) ("ITihe Cali-
fornia Supreme Court has ordered that certain opinions of the court of appeal be 'depub-
lished,' that is, not printed in the Official Reports .... [I]t has done this because a
majority of the justices consider the opinion to be wrong in some significant way,.such
that it would mislead the bench and bar if it remained as citable precedent.").
See also CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2-100 (1991), which provides:
Communication with a Represented Party
(A) While representing a client, a member shall not communicate directly or
indirectly about the subject of the representation with a party the member
knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the member
has the consent of the other lawyer.
(B) For purposes of this rule, a "party" includes:
(1) An officer, director, or managing agent of a corporation or associa-
tion, and a partner or managing agent of a partnership, or
(2) An association member or an employee of an association, corpora-
tion, or partnership.
Nevertheless, on a motion for reconsideration or leave to appeal, the appellate divi-
sion ruled that the "depublication" of the Hewlett-Packard case "has no effect on the
persuasive value inherent in the reasoning expressed in the decision." 545 N.Y.S.2d at
162.
" This test has been adopted by two district courts. See B.H. by Monahan v. John-
son, 128 F.R.D. 659 (N.D. 11. 1989) (in class action suit brought against government
agency, court will make determination whether employees of the organization are cov-
ered by the Rule precluding ex parte contacts based on facts of the case); Morrison v.
Brandeis Univ., 125 F.R.D. 14 (D. Mass. 1989) (in a sex discrimination case brought by
university instructor against university following denial of tenure, court held it would
determine which university employees were "parties" by analyzing interests and needs of
both sides on basis of facts and circumstances of case); Mompoint v. Lotus Dev. Corp.,
110 F.R.D. 414 (D. Mass. 1986) (in a sex discrimination action brought by corporate
employee against corporate defendant for wrongful termination court held that facts and
circumstances of particular case dictated whether a protective order prohibiting ex parte
contact with corporate employees should issue).
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involved in an accident while on duty or with an employee who
witnessed alleged sex discrimination against a co-employee de-
pends on the court's consideration of each party's interests in
protection and in acquiring necessary facts. Preventing off-the-
record conversations with corporate employee-witnesses may
frustrate a plaintiff-employee's efforts to obtain relief; however,
permitting informal interviews of employees will undoubtedly
jeopardize the corporate party. The court's decision ultimately
rests on its appraisal of the facts and circumstances of the indi-
vidual case.104
The balancing test has been criticized for its failure to offer
attorneys concrete guidelines of ethical behavior 1°5 and for its
inefficient use of judicial resources.106 Although the disciplinary
rules endeavor to provide attorneys with guidelines to gauge
their conduct, the balancing test fails to offer attorneys any
practical standard by which to conduct discovery.107 Since the
test operates on a case-by-case basis, the parties must litigate
whether ex parte interviews are permissible under the circum-
stances of the particular case. Given the overcrowding of court
calendars, a standard that actually increases litigation rather
than streamlining it is unsatisfactory.108 In addition, the balanc-
ing test cannot ensure a consistent and impartial application of
the Rule to all parties. Rather, it assesses "each case indepen-
dently, emphasizing the interests of the case at hand, and not
the interests of future or past litigants."109 As one commentator
'" In Morrison the court described why it opted for a case.by-case balancing test:
A plaintiff's need to gather information on an informal basis on the one hand
and the defendant's need for effective representation on the other can, in most
cases, only be balanced with reference to the facts and circumstances which
appertain to the particular case at hand. Those tests which purport to strike a
universal balance in all cases do not, in my view, adequately meet the needs of
either party.
125 F.R.D. at 18.
'01 Niesig, 76 N.Y.2d at 374, 558 N.E.2d at 1035, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 498 (the balancing
test "give[s] too little guidance"). An attorney who violates the Rule risks sanctions or
even disqualification. See text accompanying notes 13-16 supra.
106 Krulewitch, supra note 3, at 1296.
107 Id. ("Because the disciplinary rules often do have sanctions as enforcement
mechanisms, it would be unjust to subject attorneys to an uncertain standard.").
103 Id. ("Since the balancing test provides no general standard to guide the behavior
of the parties, disputes concerning the interpretation of DR 7-104(A)(1) will be
common.").
1o Id. at 1297.
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has pointed out, "While the rule may achieve justice in the mi-
crocosm of a particular case, in the macrocosm of the legal sys-
tem the rule often fails to promote a just result."110 For these
reasons the balancing test is "unworkable."
111
3. The Scope of Employment Test
The "scope of employment" test permits an attorney to in-
terview corporate employees, without the consent of the corpora-
tion's attorney, on subjects outside the scope of their employ-
ment, so long as no deception is practiced.1 12 For instance, an
adverse attorney would be prohibited from interviewing on an ex
parte basis a truck driver-employee who was involved in an acci-
dent while on duty, but would be permitted to interview'an em-
ployee who happened to observe an incident over which he had
neither responsibility nor authority, such as an incident of sex
discrimination in the workplace.' 3
11o Id.
" Niesig, 76 N.Y.2d at 374, 558 N.E.2d at 1035, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 498.
212 City of N.Y. Bar Ass'n, Op. 80-46 (1982) [hereinafter Opinion 80-461] (citing
Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(4) which states that "[a] lawyer shall not . . . [e]ngage in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation").
While not widely embraced, the test has been advocated by two bar associations and
one state court. See Opinion 80-46, supra (arguing that the Code in DR 7-104(A)(1) has
determined that the consideration of a party's need for discovery must be subordinated
to the need to protect an adverse lay party from unsupervised communication with op-
posing counsel, and concluding that the scope of employment test best protects the cor-
poration's right to effective representation); Massachusetts Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 82-7
(1982), cited in Krulewitch, supra note 3, at 1292 ("[T]o prevent adverse counsel from
obtaining admissions against the corporation through ex parte interviews, such inter.
views must be considered violative of DR 7-104(A)(1) if they involve matters within the
scope of the employee's employment."). See also Pearce v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., No.
86-0008, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13236, at *6 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (adopting the approach
taken by the City of N.Y. Bar Association which it found to be "quite cogent").
For support for this standard, see Miller & Calfo, supra note 77, at 1058 (arguing
that Opinion 80-46 takes into account the failure of the alter ego test to protect corpora-
tions against binding admissions by low-level employees); Stahl, supra note 77, at 1199
(asserting that the definition of "party" adopted in Opinion 80-46 "represents a logical
extension of the United States Supreme Court's analysis and conclusions in Upjohn").
'" Opinion 80-46, supra note 112, actually cites a hypothetical application of the
test in a situation that mirrors the one at issue in Niesig:
For example, if an employee happened to observe an incident over which he
had neither responsibility nor authority, such as an accident at the site of his
employer, his statements on the subject would relate to matters outside the
scope of his employment and adverse counsel could approach him directly
without running afoul of DR 7-104(a)(1).
Opinion 80-46, supra note 112.
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A decided benefit of the scope of employment test is that it
upholds an attorney's right to free and candid discussions with
employees who are not involved in the subject matter of the suit,
while at the same time it protects the corporate party from po-
tentially damaging admissions by its employees, whether mana-
gerial or not. In addition, the test is arguably a well-established
standard because it derives from agency law,114 tort law,110 and
the law of evidence. 1 Essentially, the evidentiary principle
under the Federal Rules of Evidence and under some states' law
is that an employee may make a statement concerning a matter
within the scope of her employment which is thereafter admissi-
ble as an admission against the corporation.'" Where the poten-
tial f6r such admissions exists, the employee is deemed to be off-
114 The Restatement (Second) of Agency defines "scope of employment" as follow-:
(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if:
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform;
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits;
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master, and
(d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against another, the use
of force is not unexpectable by the master.
RESTATEMNT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958).
115 "A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while
acting in the scope of their employment." RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1)
(1958). This principle of vicarious liability is a fundamental concept of tort law. See NV.
PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TorS § 70, at 501-502 (5th
ed. 1984) ("Once it is determined that the man at work is a servant, the master becomes
subject to vicarious liability for his torts .... [H]iS vicarious liability... extends to any
and all tortious conduct of the servant which is within the 'scope of employment.' ").
"' Krulewitch, supra note 3, at 1294 n.123 ("The scope of employment standard is
based upon Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D). Because this is a well-established
standard, parties will be able to determine from prior litigation and court rulings what
falls within the scope of an employee's employment."); see also Opinion 8046, supra
note 112, ("[O]ur interpretation of DR 7-104(a)(1) is co-extensive with the evidentinry
rule that an employee may make a statement concerning a matter within the scope of his
employment which is thereafter admissible through the testimony of the interviewer as
an admission by the corporation." (citing FED. R. EID. 801(d)(2)(D)).
1' The applicable rule is Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D). See note 69 supra.
The evidentiary principle of admissions by an employee or agent is also found in the law
of agency. According to Restatement (Second) of Agency § 286:
In an action between the principal and a third person, statements of an agent
to a third person are admissible in evidence against the principal to prove the
truth of facts asserted in them as though made by the principal, if the agent
was authorized to make the statement or was authorized to make, on the
principal's behalf, any statements concerning the subject matter.
REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 286 (1958) (emphasis added). As in New York's
hearsay exception, admissibility under agency law depends upon the principal's authori-
zation. See note 70 supra.
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limits to opposing counsel for informal interviews.
The appellate division and court of appeals in Niesig re-
jected this test on the ground that New York's hearsay excep-
tion is different from the federal rule."" Under New York law,
the statement of an employee is admissible against her employer
under the admissions exception to the hearsay rule "only if the
making of the statement is an activity within the scope of his
authority.""" Applying this standard to determine which em-
ployees are parties for purposes of DR 7-104(A)(1), attorneys
will be prevented from informally interviewing only those em-
ployees authorized by the corporation to speak. Since it is ex-
ceedingly rare that an employer will confer such authority on its
employees, few employees will be off-limits to opposing counsel,
leaving corporate parties sorely unprotected under this standard.
The most significant problem with this test, however, is in-
terpreting the breadth of the ambiguous phrase "scope of em-
ployment." As commentators have put it: "This highly indefinite
phrase, which sometimes is varied with 'in the course of the em-
ployment,' is so devoid of meaning in itself that its very vague-
ness has been of value in permitting a desirable degree of flexi-
bility in decisions. "112 However, this flexibility is not desirable in
118 149 A.D.2d at 103-04, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 157-58; 76 N.Y.2d at 374, 558 N.E.2d at
1035, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 498.
Although the court of appeals in Niesig expressly rejected the scope of employment
test, the court effectively incorporated the principles behind the scope of employment
test into its modified alter ego test by placing off limits those employees whose acts or
omissions are "imputed to the corporation for purposes of its liability." Id.; see notes 138
& 139 and accompanying text infra.
119 See Loschiavo v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 58 N.Y.2d 1040, 1041, 448 N.E.2d
1351, 1352, 462 N.Y.S.2d 440, 441 (1983); see also Kelly v. Diesel Constr. Div. of Carl A.
Morse, 35 N.Y.2d 1, 315 N.E.2d 751, 358 N.Y.S.2d 685 (1974) (in a negligence action
brought by employee against subcontractor held that statements of superintendent for
general contractor were properly excluded at trial in absence of showing that superinten-
dent was authorized by general contractor to make admissions); EDITH L. FISCH, NEW
YORK EVIDENCE § 800 (2d ed. 1977); CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §
267 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984); JEROME PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE § 253
(10th ed. 1973). Cf. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(D) (see note 69 supra for text).
' PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 115, § 70, at 502. Other commentators have ar-
gued that the "amorphous standard" adopted in the Restatement (Second) of Agency
requires analysis of a myriad of factors to assess whether an employee's conduct, "al-
though not authorized, is nevertheless so similar to or incidental to the conduct author-
ized as to be within the scope of employment." Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis,
Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes
of Conduct, 78 GEo. L.J. 1559, 1565 n.24 (1990) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 229(2) (1958)).
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construing the scope of the term "party" in DR 7-104(A)(1).
Lawyers who must rely on the test to determine which employ-
ees are sheltered by the Rule risk severe penalties if they mis-
judge its scope and contact protected employees.
1 21
4. The Control Group Test
The "control group" test permits attorneys to interview any
employees not in the corporation's control group, that is, "those
top management persons who ha[ve] the responsibility of mak-
ing final decisions and those employees whose advisory roles to
top management are such that a decision would not normally be
made without those persons' advice or opinion. 11 22 Under this
narrow standard, few employees, except the company's board of
directors and senior officers, are protected against ex parte con-
tacts by opposing counsel.1 2' Thus, an attorney would be permit-
To resolve the ambiguity in the phrase "scope of employment," commentators have
offered different interpretations. For example, according to Prosser & Keeton, the scope
of employment encompasses "acts which are so closely connected with what the servant
is employed to do, and so fairly and reasonably incidental to it, that they may be re-
garded as methods, even though quite improper ones, of carrying out the objectives of
the employment" PROSSER & KE=rON, supra note 115, § 70, at 502. Another commenta-
tor has opted for a simpler definition. A tort is within the scope of employment if "it can
be said rationally that the employment is the primary cause of the tort." WARREN A.
SEAvEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 87(A), at 148 (1964). cited in Alan 0. Sykes,
The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employ-
ment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HAnv. L. REv. 563, 583 nn.48 & 49 (advanc-
ing suggestions for reforming the scope-of-employment limitation).
On the other hand, some acts by employees are generally accepted to be outside the
scope of employment. For example, in the classic "frolic and detour" cases an employee
who deviates from his assigned tasks for personal errands or other personal business
while on travel for the employer is said to step outside his employment. PROsSER & KEE-
TON, supra note 115, § 70, at 503. Thus, no liability for his act is foisted upon the em-
ployer. Id. Whether an officer's ex parte communication with adverse counsel regarding
another employee's act or omission, in which he had no involvement and over which he
had no authority, is within or without that officer's scope of employment is less obvious.
121 See notes 15-16 and accompanying text supra.
12 Fair Automotive Repair, Inc. v. Car-X Serv. Sys., 471 N.E.2d 554, 560 (11M. App.
Ct 1984) (a defamation suit in which plaintiff alleged defendant had violated the Rule
by conducting informal, unethical interviews with plaintiff's employees by hiring investi-
gators who posed as customers, court denied plaintiff's motion, holding that the investi-
gations were not violative because the emplyees contacted were not within plaintifrs
control group).
,"3 The control group test has been adopted by a state court in Illinois, a district
court in Kansas and by bar associations in California, Arizona and Idaho. See Fair Auto-
motive, 471 N.E.2d at 554; Maxwell v. Southwestern Bell Tel Co., No. 80-4239 (D. Kan.
Oct. 28, 1980), cited in Chancellor v. Boeing Co., 678 F. Supp. 250, 251 (D. Kan. 1988).
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ted to interview informally a truck driver-employee involved in
an accident while on duty as well as any corporate employee not
within the control group who may have been a witness to an in-
cident that may give rise to litigation, such as discrimination by
one employee against another.
While the test promotes broad access to relevant informa-
tion,"' an important policy underlying the Rule, the control
group test has been criticized as dangerous to corporate par-
ties.125 One of the principal purposes of DR 7-104(A)(1) is to
protect a represented party from being taken advantage of by an
opposing attorney; limiting the applicability of the Rule to the
control group arguably defeats this purpose.2 ' In addition, the
test is unpredictable since it is not always apparent which em-
ployees comprise the company's control group.1 27 Furthermore,
See also Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n, Op. 369 (1977) (digested in OLAVI MARU, 1980
SUPPLEMENT TO THE DIGEST Op BAR ASSOCIATION ETHICS OPINIONS 75-76 (1982)) (distin-
guishing employees with "authority to negotiate," whose admissions are valid and who
have access to confidential corporate information); Arizona State Bar Ass'n, Op. 203
(1966) (digested in OLAVI MARU. 1970 SUPPLEMENT TO THE DIGEST OF BAR ASSOCIATION
ETHICS OPINIONS 127 (1972) (employees who "speak for and bind" municipality); Idaho
State Bar Ass'n, Op. 21 (1960) (digested in OLAVI MARU, DIGEST OF BAR ASSOCIATION
ETHICS OPINIONS 105 (1970)) (officers and directors who were the corporation's alter ego).
124 Neisig, 76 N.Y.2d at 373, 558 N.E.2d at 1035, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 498.
In his concurring opinion in Niesig, Judge Bellacosa advocated the adoption of the
control group test on the grounds that this test fosters certainty and predictability and
better balances the respective interests of the parties. 76 N.Y.2d at 377, 558 N.E.2d at
1037, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 500. However, Judge Bellacosa failed to confront the problem ar-
ticulated by the Supreme Court in Upjohn, namely that middle and/or low-level employ-
ees often possess sensitive information which when divulged may have serious legal
ramifications for the corporation. Judge Bellacosa also failed to recognize that the alter
ego test provides more protection for the corporation than the control group test. See
notes 133-42 and accompanying text infra.
125 76 N.Y.2d at 373, 558 N.E.2d at 1035, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 498 (the control group test
gives "insufficient regard to the principles motivating DR 7-104(A)(1) ... [and] all but
'nullifies the benefits of the disciplinary rule to corporations.'" (quoting Krulewitch,
supra note 3, at 1287-88)). See also Morrison v. Brandeis Univ., 125 F.R.D. 14, 16-17 (D.
Mass. 1989) (criticizing the control group test because it conflicts with Fed. R. Evid.
801(d)(2)(D) which does not limit the admissibility of statements against a corporation
to statements made by its officers, directors or managing agents, but also permits admis-
sions by parties or their agents or servants concerning matters within the scope of their
employment); Massa v. Eaton Corp., 109 F.R.D. 312, 313-14 (W.D. Mich. 1985) (arguing
that the control group test is an unduly restrictive interpretation of the disciplinary rule,
at least to the extent that it allows middle or upper level management personnel of a
corporate party to be interviewed informally).
126 Krulewitch, supra note 3, at 1287.
Id. at 1288; see Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) ("Disparate
decisions in cases applying this test illustrate its unpredictability. Compare Hogan v.
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the validity of the control group standard appears to have been
vitiated by the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Upjohn in which the Court declined to restrict the attorney-cli-
ent privilege to those corporate employees in the control
group.128 Overall, the control group test provides very little pro-
tection to corporations from ex parte communications and
places the corporate party at substantial risk of being taken ad-
vantage of by opposing counsel, thereby undermining the pri-
mary purpose of the Rule.
5. The Alter Ego Test
The "alter ego" or "managing-speaking agent" test defines
corporate "parties" as those "employees who have the legal au-
thority to 'bind' the corporation in the legal evidentiary sense
...[that is], those employees who have 'speaking authority' for
the corporation."'1 29 The test, developed by the American Bar
Association, is increasingly favored by courts and bar associa-
Zletz, 43 F.R.D. 308, 315-16 (N.D.Okla. 1967), affld in part sub nom. Natta v. Hogan, 392
F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968) (control group includes managers and assistant managers of
patent division and research and development department) with Congoleum Indus. v.
GAF Corp., 49 F.R.D. 82, 83-85 (E.D.Pa. 1969), aff'd, 478 F.2d 1398 (3rd Cir. 1973) (con-
trol group includes only division and corporate vice presidents and not two directors of
research and vice president for production and research)."). See also Opinion 80-46,
supra note 112, (arguing that it is difficult for attorneys to determine whether employees
are within the control group in light of the realities of modern corporate operations).
128 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 683-84. Although the court of appeals acknowledged the
Supreme Court's concern that corporations were not adequately protected under the
overly narrow control group standard, it found Upjohn to be inapplicable to defining the
scope of the Rule. See note 64 supra. But see Krulewitch, supra note 3, at 1288 (arguing
that the Supreme Court's vigorous attack on the control group test in Upjohn for pro-
viding too little protection to corporations "renders dubious the use of the control group
test to determine the applicability of DR 7-104(A)(1) to corporations").
129 Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 691 P.2d 564, 569 (Wash. 1984). See also
DRINKER, supra note 22, at 201 (DR 7-104(A)(1) "probably precludes interviews of man-
aging employees of a corporation having authority to bind it")(citation omitted).
To "bind" a corporation means "to obligate [it]; to bring or place [it] under definite
duties or legal obligations, particularly by a bond or covenant." (emphasis added).
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 168 (6th ed. 1991). According to established principles of
agency law, the "'power of an agent' denotes the ability of an agent ... to affect the
legal relations of the principal in matters connected with the agency .... The exercise of
this power may result in binding the principal to a third person in contract." RzsTAmr-
MENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 12 cmt. a (1958). Although the Wright court and others that
have adopted this standard refer to the legal evidentiary premise which underlies the
Rule, they have actually relied more on principles of contract and agency law than those
of evidence law. Krulewitch, supra note 3, at 1301 n.175.
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tions. 13 The alter ego test precludes contacts by adverse counsel
with all employees who have authority to make managerial deci-
sions."' 1 It does not, however, distinguish between nonmanager-
ial employees who simply witnessed an event and those whose
acts or omissions caused the event leading to the action.132 Thus,
a managerial-level employee would be off-limits to adverse coun-
sel investigating alleged sex discrimination against another cor-
porate employee; however, a nonmanagerial employee who wit-
nessed or even participated in the offensive acts could be
approached. Likewise, opposing counsel would have the right to
contact a low-level truck driver-employee who was involved in
an accident while on company business.
The alter ego test has been praised by a number of courts
11 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1410
(1978). See note 68 supra.
For a nonexclusive list of authorities advocating the alter ego standard, see Niesig,
76 N.Y.2d at 375 n.5, 558 N.E.2d at 1036 n.5, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 499 n.5 (citing Bey v.
Village of Arlington Heights, 50 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1375 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (in an
employment discrimination action, held that plaintiff-employee's counsel may interview
lower ecehlon police department employees who do not have "speaking authority" for
the department); Porter v. Arco Metals Co., 642 F. Supp. 1116 (D. Mont. 1986) (in a suit
alleging wrongful termination, court held that employee-plaintiff's attorney could con-
duct ex parte interviews of employees, except those with managerial responsibilities con-
cerning the matter in litigation); Frey v. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 106 F.R.D.
32 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (in sex discrimination suit, court found that plaintiff could not con-
tact employees who were defendant agency's alter ego, including high level managerial
employees who participated in decision not to promote plaintiff, but could contact other
employees informally); Shealy v. Laidlaw Bros, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1223
(D.S.C. 1984) (in age discrimination suit, held that counsel for former employee may
communicate informally with those employees who are not officers, directors or manag-
ing agents); Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 691 P.2d 564 (Wash. 1984) (in a medical
malpractice action, court held that plaintiffs had right to interview on an ex parte basis
any current and former employees of defendant hospital who did not have managing
authority sufficient to give them right to speak for and bind corporation); see also opin-
ions by state bar associations, including Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho,
Maine, Texas and Virginia.
"' It has been called a "flexible [test] under the circumstances of each case." See
Wright, 691 P.2d at 569 (citing Young v. Group Health Coop., 534 P.2d 1349 (Wash.
1975) (doctor had speaking authority for hospital); Griffiths v. Big Bear Stores, Inc., 347
P.2d 532 (Wash. 1959) (manager of supermarket had speaking authority); Kadiak Fisher-
ies Co. v. Murphy Diesel Co., 422 P.2d 496 (Wash. 1967) (maintenance manager for com-
mercial fishing company did not have speaking authority)).
32 Wright, 691 P.2d at 569 ("It is not the purpose of the rule to protect a corporate
party from the revelation of prejudicial facts. Rather, the rule's function is to preclude
the interviewing of those corporate employees who have the authority to bind the corpo-




and commentators as the best interpretation of the scope of DR
7-104(A)(1) on the'ground that it provides a flexible, practical
standard that best balances the competing interests.133 The prin-
cipal benefit of this approach is its respect for the parties' com-
pelling needs for accessibility to the truth. However, the alter
ego test is ultimately unsatisfactory because it is too narrow.
Like the control group test, the alter ego approach does not ac-
count for middle and lower level employees who do not make
managerial decisions, but nevertheless possess sensitive informa-
tion which if disclosed may be acutely damaging to the corpora-
tion. Furthermore, it does not prevent ex parte communications
by adverse counsel with employees whose acts or omissions have
precipitated events giving rise to litigation. Although the ABA
alter ego test provides the corporate party greater protection
against ex parte interviews than does the control group test, it
fails to guard against contacts by opposing counsel with those
nonmanagerial employees whose acts or omissions may be im-
puted to the corporation for purposes of its liability.134
B. The Modified Alter Ego Test Adopted by the Court of
Appeals
In Niesig the court of appeals formulated a modified three-
part alter ego test for interpreting the scope of the corporate
party under DR 7-104(A)(1). The modified alter ego test it de-
vised expands the ABA alter ,ego standard to prohibit ex parte
contacts with a larger pool of corporate employees, and thereby
provides adequate protection for the corporate party. The
Niesig test defines a corporate "party" to include employees
"whose acts or omissions in the matter under inquiry are (1)
binding on the corporation (in effect, the corporation's 'alter
egos'), or (2) imputed to the corporation for purposes of its lia-
I" See, e.g., Wright, 691 P.2d at 569; see also Krulewitch, supra note 3, at 1300-05
(advocating that courts adopt the alter ego test as the uniform standard).
13, Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a corporation is vicariously liable for
its employees' acts or omissions within the scope of their employment. PRossnn & KEE-
TON, supra note 115, § 70, at 501-502; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGFNCv § 219 (1958).
See also Miller & Calfo, supra note 77, at 1060 (criticizing the alter ego test for failing to
account adequately for the fact that nonmanagerial employees may make admissions




bility, or (3) employees implementing the advice of counsel."' 13
In effect, it synthesizes the alter ego test, scope of employment
test and control group test into an acceptable, practical
standard.
136
Part one of the Niesig test adopts the ABA alter ego test
and shields from adverse counsel "those officials, but only those,
who have the legal power to bind the corporation in the mat-
ter.' 3 7 Part two expands the ABA alter ego definition to include
employees, whether managerial or not, whose acts or omissions
are imputed to the corporation for purposes of its liability. This
part protects the corporation from an adversary's attempt to
gain a "potential unfair advantage" by extracting concessions
and admissions from those whose acts are binding on the corpo-
ration under the doctrine of respondeat superior, 3 Although
part two of the Niesig test is similar to the scope of employment
test, the formulation adopted by the court of appeals-"imputed
to the corporation for purposes of its liability"-is preferable be-
cause it embraces the evidentiary principles behind that test but
avoids the ambiguities and limitations in the scope of employ-
ment standard.139 Part three of the test prohibits contacts with
""employees implementing the advice of counsel."1 40 Concerned
about "the protection of the attorney-client privilege," the court
placed off-limits to opposing counsel those high-level employees
who are in contact with corporate counsel and are authorized to
implement corporate counsel's advice, that is, the corporation's
control group.'14 Under part one of the Niesig test, an attorney
... Niesig, 76 N.Y.2d at 374, 558 N.E.2d at 1035, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 498.
3I According to the court of appeals, this test "best balances the competing inter-
ests[] and incorporates the most desirable elements of the other approaches." Id.
"I Id. (quoting WOLFRAM, supra note 17, § 11.6, at 613).
138 Id. See note 134 supra.
Note that at least one court has construed the comment to Model Rule 4.2, supra
note 17, to mean that not only are the alter egos of the corporation off limits, but also
those employees whose acts are imputed to the corporation for purposes of liability. See
Chancellor v. Boeing Co., 678 F. Supp. 250 (D. Kan. 1988) (court held that plaintiffs
attorney was prohibited from informally interviewing managerial employees or
nonmanagerial employees who might have been involved in the incident if their actions
could be imputed to the corporation for purposes of civil liability).
"' Neisig, 76 N.Y.2d at 374, 558 N.E.2d at 1035, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 498; see notes 118.
21 and accompanying text supra.
Neisig, 76 N.Y.2d at 374, 558 N.E.2d at 1035, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 498.
1 Id. (citing Polycast Technology Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 621, 625, 628-
29 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (arguing that one of the policies behind DR 7-104(A)(1) is preserva-
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would be prevented from informally interviewing a managerial-
level employee regarding alleged sex discrimination against an-
other corporate employee; however, an attorney could approach
a nonmanagerial employee-witness to the discrimination. Under
part two of the test, an adverse attorney would not be permitted
to contact a low-level truck driver-employee who is involved in
an accident while on company business, since her actions may be
imputed to the defendant corporation for purposes of its liabil-
ity. The attorney could, however, interview an employee who
witnessed the event.142 Finally, under part three of the test, a
plaintiff's attorney could not approach a high-ranking corporate
official on an ex parte basis regarding actions the official had
taken on the advice of corporate counsel.
Under the modified alter ego test, a defendant corporation
is shielded from unwanted ex parte communications with its
managerial employees as well as nonmanagerial employees
whose acts or omissions can result in liability for the corpora-
tion. At the same time, plaintiffs are afforded the opportunity to
contact employee witnesses who may offer valuable information
in the absence of corporate counsel. Thus, the Niesig alter ego
test represents the best solution to the problem of interpreting
the scope of DR 7-104(A)(1) in a way that is fair to the interests
of both parties.
C. Legal Support for the Niesig Test
Although the court of appeals asserted in Niesig that its de-
cision was based on "policy" considerations,143 the court also ac-
tion of the integrity of the attorney-client relationship)); 1 GEOFFREY C. HAR. JR. & V.
WLm HODEs. THE LAW OF LAWYERINO 436-37 (Supp. 1989) (arguing that some former
managerial employees might be covered by the Rule since they might be privy to privi-
leged information).
In fact, part three of the Niesig test is not really distinguishable from part one of
the test. Part three protects against ex parte communications with the corporation's con-
trol group, and part one protects against such contacts with managerial employees, which
clearly includes the control group. The court's purpose in formulating part three of the
test appears to be to underscore that the protection provided to corporate parties by the
Rule complements that of the attorney-client privilege. See text accompanying notes
174-81 infra. See also Clauss & Homan, supra note 2, at 24 (referring to this part of the
Niesig test as "an important addition" to the alter ego standard).
142 This result would not be obtained under the ABA alter ego test. See note 132
and accompanying text supra.
"4 76 N.Y.2d at 368, 558 N.E.2d at 1031, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 494. See note 76 supra.
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knowledged that its adoption of a modified alter ego test was
strongly supported by case law and "rooted in developed con-
cepts of the law of evidence and the law of agency."'1 44 This sec-
tion of the Comment examines the wealth of legal support for
the Niesig alter ego test.
1. Case Law and Bar Association Opinions
In Niesig the court of appeals declared that the test it
adopted was "similar [to] . . .the one overwhelmingly adopted
by courts and bar associations throughout the country," that is,
the ABA alter ego test.145 The court argued that the test's "long
practical experience persuades us that-in day-to-day opera-
tion-it is workable."' 4' To support its position the court cited
as persuasive authority cases that had employed the ABA alter
ego test to achieve a just result.
147
For example, the court cifed a Washington Supreme Court
case, Wright v. Group Health Hospital, which is the leading
case for the alter ego standard. 48 In Wright plaintiffs suing a
health maintenance organization and a physician-employee
sought a protective order declaring that their attorney had the
right to conduct ex parte interviews of nurses and other employ-
ees of the defendant organization. The defendant contended
that it had a policy of instructing its employees not to discuss
cases with anyone other than the organization's outside counsel.
However, the Washington Supreme Court rejected the defend-
ant's argument as obstructionist and recognized that a "flexible
interpretation of 'parties' . . . advances the policy of keeping the
testimony of employee witnesses freely accessible to both par-
ties.' 49 Applying the ABA alter ego test, the court held that the
plaintiffs had the right to contact the defendant's employees
who did not have authority sufficient to give them the right to
speak for and bind the corporation.
In another case cited by the court, a federal district court in
"' 76 N.Y.2d at 375, 559 N.E.2d at 1036, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 499.
145 Id.
140 Id.
"I Id.; see note 88 and accompanying text supra. Although the case law cited by the
court expressly supports the ABA alter ego test, the policy arguments advanced in such
cases also support the court of appeals' broader, more satisfactory, alter ego test.
148 691 P.2d 564 (Wash. 1984).
149 Id. at 569.
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New York applied the ABA alter ego test in a sex discrimination
action against the Social Security Administration. The plaintiff
in Frey v. Department of Health & Human Services alleged she
was denied a promotion because of her sex.1 " The agency moved
for a protective order to prevent the plaintiff's counsel from con-
tacting any agency employees outside formal discovery proce-
dures. The court, however, denied the defendant's motion on the
ground that such a broad order was "in direct conflict with the
goal of broad access to witnesses to uncover and present all rele-
vant evidence to the fact finder."151 Weighing the plaintiff's need
for information in the exclusive possession of the defendant
against the defendant's need for protection, the court found that
the plaintiff's need was particularly acute since the defendant
was a vast government agency encompassing many organiza-
tional departments and thousands of employees.5 2 Thus the
court held that the plaintiff had the right to interview informally
all agency employees, except those employees who were the
agency's alter egos and those high level managerial employees
who participated in the decision not to promote the plaintiff,
even though they lacked the power to bind the agency.
In addition to citing case law as persuasive authority for its
adoption of a modified alter ego test, the court of appeals noted
that the alter ego test is advocated by the ABA0 5 and has been
endorsed by bar associations nationwide. 4 Bar association eth-
ics opinions typically provide answers to lawyers' questions on
professional conduct, but they are also a "means by which the
bar establishment can affirm its conception of the appropriate
roles and attitudes of lawyers." 0 5 While ethics opinions do not
have the significance of stare decisis, they are useful to courts in
assessing professional standards. 56 The numerous bar associa-
"' 106 F.R.D. 32 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
"' Id. at 36.
252 Id.
153 ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct 71:303-71:304 (1984). See
also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1410 (1978)
(discussed at note 68 supra).
"' 76 N.Y.2d at 375 n.5, 558 N.E.2d at 1036 n.5, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 499 n.5 (citing ten
state bar associations, one city bar association and the District of Columbia bar
association).
"I WoLFRAM, supra note 17, § 2.6.6, at 65 (discussing the changing significance of
ethics opinions).
" According to Wolfram, ethics opinions are rarely cited and relied upon in judicial
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tion ethics opinions advocating an alter ego test suggest that the
test has been successfully applied by lawyers throughout the na-
tion and lends further legitimacy in terms of uniformity, to the
Niesig court's ruling.157
2. Law of Agency and Evidence
The modified alter ego test adopted by the Niesig court to
determine the parameters of the corporate party for purposes of
the disciplinary rule also takes into account established princi-
ples of the law of agency and law of evidence. 158 The Niesig test
recognizes the defendant corporation's vulnerability to ex parte
contacts with certain of its employees and limits those contacts
according to agency and evidentiary principles.
Since a corporation is an artificial entity, it must act
through its employees. 159 Agency law recognizes a legal relation-
ship between the corporation or "principal" and its employees or
"agents."1 0 The agency relationship is a fiduciary relationship in
which the fiduciary or agent acts on behalf of the corporation; in
return, the corporation assumes vicarious liability for torts that
its employees or agents commit within the course of employ-
ment.""' This concept of vicarious liability is also embraced by
the law of evidence which provides that statements made by an
employee concerning a matter within the scope of employment
may be admissible against the corporate employer as an
admission.2
6 2
Under the agency doctrine of vicarious liability and the cor-
responding evidentiary principle, a corporation is exposed to lia-
decisions; however, they "retain potential educational value through publication in bar
journals and other lawyer periodicals." Id.
"I" Niesig, 76 N.Y.2d at 375, 558 N.E.2d at 1036, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 499.
Id.
"A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in
contemplation of law." Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636
(1819).
160 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 cmts. a, b (1958) (describing the relation
of agency and its effects); see id. § 2 cmts. d, e (1958) (defining "principals" and
"agents").
' Id. § 219(1); see note 115 supra. Regarding the principle of vicarious liability, see
also text accompanying notes 112-21 supra.
16 FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(D) (see note 69 supra); cf. note 70 supra (New York's




bility by the conduct of its employees. Thus an opposing attor-
ney's unmonitored contacts with managerial employees or with
nonmanagerial employees whose conduct is imputed to the cor-
poration for purposes of its liability are dangerous to the corpo-
ration. Whether or not the statements are ultimately admissible,
the contacts could undermine the corporation's defense strategy
and negotiating posture.1 1 3 Such contacts fall squarely within
the kind of conduct the Rule was meant to prevent.
The court of appeals incorporated agency and evidentiary
principles into its definition of the corporate party. The Niesig
test places off-limits to adverse counsel not only those manage-
rial employees with power to bind the corporation, but also
those middle and lower level employees whose acts or omissions
may be imputed to the corporation for purposes of its liability.
Therefore, the modified alter ego test created by the court of
appeals provides corporate parties with adequate protection
against overzealous opposing counsel."'
"' Under New York's evidence law, admissions by an employee within the scope of
employment are not admissible unless the employee is authorized by the employer to
speak. See note 70 supra. Since it is rare for a corporation to grant employees this
power, admissions by employees will rarely be admissible. Nevertheless, the court of ap-
peals recognized that revealing employees' admissions to adverse counsel can damage a
corporation's defense strategy and therefore, prohibited such ex parte contacts. See
notes 138-39 and accompanying text supra.
164 Some commentators have criticized the court's apparent limitation on the evi-
dentiary use of informally obtained statements in light of New York's hearsay exception
which is somewhat narrower than that of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Clauss &
Homan, supra note 2, at 24; notes 69 & 70 supra. Clauss and Homan argue that the
court did not expressly address how statements obtained in informal ex parte interviews
could be used. Although the court's dicta about the necessity of "off-the-record private"
interviews and its rejection of the scope of employment test can be read to mean that the
court will not permit such informal interviews to be used as evidence in New York state
courts, they contend that the absence of a direct statement on the matter could lead to a
disparity of results. Furthermore, the court did not consider that federal courts in New
York are not bound to enforce the New York state court's view of what constitutes ethi-
cal professional conduct. Although federal courts in New York have tended to apply the
alter ego test, such courts are governed by the federal hearsay rule which allows the
statements of a broad range of employees to be used as admissions by the corporation.
Thus they argue counsel in New York may be faced with two different sets of rules,
depending on where the case is filed. Id.
Nevertheless, even if such informal interviews cannot be used as admissions-and
generally they will not be-the fact remains that informal meetings with corporate em-
ployees provide adverse counsel with important factual information and aid in investi-
gating the merits of the case. See notes 18-27 and accompanying text supra.
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3. Public Policy Considerations
In Niesig the court of appeals expressly grounded its deci-
sion on public policy considerations."6 5 The modified alter ego
test it adopted fulfills the Rule's dual objectives: to preserve the
functioning of the attorney-client relationship and to protect the
opposing party from improper approaches. 166 With its three-part
scheme, the Niesig alter ego test is far more successful than the
ABA version in balancing the parties' competing goals. It pro-
vides greater protection for the corporate defendant by prohibit-
ing contacts with both managerial employees who have the
power to bind the corporation or who were acting on the advice
of counsel and nonmanagerial employees who have the potential
for making damaging admissions. At the same time, the Niesig
test is responsive to plaintiffs' compelling need for easy fact
gathering by sanctioning ex parte contacts with nonmanagerial
employees who are mere witnesses to the subject matter at
issue. 67
The modified alter ego test provides lawyers with a worka-
ble standard by which to determine whether or not an employee
I65 See note 76 supra.
'" ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 108 (1934).
'6 See notes 135-42 and accompanying text supra.
Some commentators have argued that the Niesig test provides inadequate protec-
tion for corporations and that the practical effect of the decision will be that corpora-
tions will avoid ex parte contacts entirely by imposing gag orders on their employees.
See, e.g., Barbara Franklin, Ripples Among Lawyers from 'Niesig' Ruling, N.Y.L.J., Aug.
2, 1990, at 1, 5 (discussing procedures that employers could implement to protect against
ex parte communications with employees); Stuart A. Schlesinger, Depositions of Em-
ployees; Videotapes, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 21, 1990, at 3 ("In real life ... counsel can be sure
that any time they seek to interview a witness, they will be told that this witness either
in fact has an interest to protect or has suddenly been promoted by the corporation as a
spokesperson."). Cf. Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 691 P.2d 565, 570 (Wash. 1984) ("An
attorney's right to interview corporate employees would be a hollow one if corporations
were permitted to instruct their employees not to meet with adverse counsel .... [A]
corporate party, or its counsel, may not prohibit its non-speaking/managing agent em-
ployees from meeting with adverse counsel.").
However, the Niesig test gives corporations significant protection. As the court of
appeals noted:
It has possession of its own information and unique access to its documents
and employees; the corporation's lawyer thus has the earliest and best oppor-
tunity to gather the facts, to elicit information from employees, and to counsel
and prepare them so that they will not make the feared improvident disclo-
sures that engendered the rule.
Niesig, 76 N.Y.2d at 372-73, 558 N.E.2d at 1034, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 497.
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can be approached informally."' Lawyers will no longer confront
an ethical dilemma when faced with the chance to interview an
employee informally since the Niesig test promotes predictabil-
ity.l6 9 In addition, it promotes judicial efficiency and cost con-
tainment since lawyers will not be forced to litigate the issue of
ex parte contacts every time the opportunity for informal inter-
views arises. Futhermore, the Niesig test safeguards the corpo-
rate attorney-client privilege by placing off-limits those employ-
ees responsible for actually effectuating the advice of counsel in
the matter. Based on these strong public policy rationales, the
Niesig alter ego test is the most effective solution to the problem
of ascertaining the scope of a corporate party for purposes of DR
7-104(A) (1).
While the court of appeals in Niesig was not asked to con-
sider questions relating to the actual conduct of ex parte inter-
views, the court did offer lawyers some practical advice on how
they should proceed when approaching corporate employees in-
formally.17 0 At a minimum, the court asserted that counsel must
"make their identity and interest known to interviewees and
comport themselves ethically."1 7' Some commentators have in-
terpreted this broad statement by the court to require certain
actions by counsel who plan to take advantage of the informal
172fact-finding process. First, counsel should determine whether
an individual employee is personally represented by counsel on
the matter and, if so, should terminate the interview. Second,
the interviewing counsel should warn employees who are to be
" Niesig, 76 N.Y.2d at 375, 558 N.E.2d at 1036, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 499 ("Apart from
striking the correct balance, this test should also become relatively clear in
application.").
"I See Krulewitch, supra note 3, at 1284-85.
Besides promoting the lofty goal of formal justice, certainty and predictability
also provide a more practical benefit: these norms enable the individuals gov-
erned by the rule to adjust their behavior to conform with the rule. If all par-
ties clearly know how a rule applies in a particular situation, the parties will
know what the law expects of them.
170 Niesig, 76 N.Y.2d at 376, 558 N.E.2d at 1036, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 499.
171 Id.
12 See Clauss & Homan, supra note 2, at 24-25; see also In re FMC Corp., 430 F.
Supp. 1108, 1111 (S.D.W. Va. 1977), cited in Clauss & Homan at 25 n.25 (discussing
requirements imposed by the government upon agency investigators before conducting
ex parte interviews). See also C. Evan Stewart, Ground Rules Shift for Ex Parte Inter-
views, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 11, 1991, at S6 (reviewing the ramifications of the Niesig decision
on corporate counsel in particular).
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interviewed not to disclose any communications they might have
had with corporate counsel. Third, counsel may consider advis-
ing interviewees that they can contact their employers to have
corporate counsel present during the interview.17 3 Fourth, coun-
sel should memorialize the process so as to be able to defend
their actions later, if necessary. By following these procedures,
attorneys can enjoy the benefits of this time-saving and inexpen-
sive discovery method sanctioned by the Niesig court, avoid the
appearance of impropriety and minimize potential claims that
the interviewing counsel went beyond the bounds of the Code.
4. The Attorney-Client Privilege
A major objective of DR 7-104(A)(1) is to preserve the at-
torney-client relationship, an important component of which is
the attorney-client privilege. 174 The purpose of the privilege is
"to ensure that one seeking legal advice will be able to confide
fully and freely in his attorney, secure in the knowledge that his
confidences will not later be exposed to public view to his em-
barrassment or legal detriment.' 1 75 It has long been recognized
that corporations may avail themselves of the attorney-client
privilege for confidential communications with corporate counsel
relating to corporate legal matters.17 6 At the same time, courts
'3 Clauss & Homan, supra note 2 at 25 (arguing that although such warnings could
impede the speed and efficiency of the informal process, such precautions might ulti-
mately serve to protect interviewing counsel against claims of overreaching).
'7 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 108 (1934) (the
original purpose of the Rule was to preserve the attorney-client relationship).
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential communi-
cations known to the common law. 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton
rev. 1961), cited in Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
'18 Priest v. Hennessy, 51 N.Y.2d 62, 67-68, 409 N.E.2d 983, 985, 431 N.Y.S.2d 511,
513-14 (1980).
M Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390 (1981) (citing United States v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R., 236 U.S. 318 (1915)). See also Rossi v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Greater N.Y., 73 N.Y.2d 588, 592, 540 N.E.2d 703, 705, 542 N.Y.S.2d 508, 510
(1989) ("A corporation's communications with counsel, no less than the communications
of other clients with counsel, are encompassed within the legislative purposes of CPLR
4503, which include fostering uninhibited dialogue between lawyers and clients in their
professional engagements, thereby ultimately promoting the administration of justice.").
In New York the privilege is codified at N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 4503(a). See notes 48 &
62 supra. See also J.A. Glenn, Annotation, Attorney-Client Privilege in Federal Courts:
Under What Circumstances Can Corporation Claim Privilege for Communications
From Its Employees and Agents to Corporation's Attorney, 9 A.L.R. FED 685 (1971);
Annotation, Comment Note, Right of Corporation to Assert Attorney-Client Privilege,
[Vol. 57:953
EX PARTE COMMUNICATIONS
have been acutely aware of the need to apply the privilege cau-
tiously and narrowly so as to prevent corporations from sealing
off potential disclosure by the mere involvement of corporate
counsel.1 7 7 One important restriction on overbroad application of
the privilege is the fact that the privilege extends only to "'con-
fidential communication[s]' made to the attorney for the pur-
pose of obtaining legal advice or services. "'178 Thus, not all com-
munications to corporate counsel are privileged; factual
information is fully discoverable.
In Niesig the court of appeals was sensitive to the impor-
tance of the attorney-client privilege and expressly stated that it
included in its definition of "party" those employees responsible
for actually effectuating the advice of counsel because of "con-
cern for the protection of the attorney-client privilege."179 Nev-
ertheless, the court's test for determining the scope of a corpo-
rate "party" for purposes of DR 7-104(A)(1) was in no way
meant to offer corporate counsel the opportunity to use the at-
torney-client privilege as a sword to impede plaintiff's counsel's
discovery. Instead, the court's opinion exhibits great regard for a
corporate adversary's need for and right to "vital informal access
to facts."'180 The modified alter ego test adopted by the court
neither augments nor decreases the privilege afforded to a corpo-
rate party; rather, it complements it.181
CONCLUSION
Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A)(1), which prohibits lawyers from
communicating on an ex parte basis with parties represented by
counsel, is founded upon strong policy rationales-to promote
the effectiveness of the legal system and protect parties from im-
proper approaches by opposing counsel. When parties are indi-
98 A.L.R.2d 241 (1964) (authorities for attorney-client privilege accorded to cor-
porations).
177 Upjohn, 449 U.S. 383. See also note 167 supra.
178 Priest, 51 N.Y.2d at 69, 409 N.E.2d at 986, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 514.
,79 76 N.Y.2d at 374, 558 N.E.2d at 1035, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 498 (citing Polycast Tech-
nology Corp. "v. Uniroyal, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 621, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("counsel is pre-
cluded from driving a wedge between the opposing attorney and that attorney's client")).
Niesig, 76 N.Y.2d at 371, 558 N.E.2d at 1033, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 496.
,' At least one commentator has criticized the Niesig opinion on the ground that
the alter ego test works at the expense of the attorney-client privilege. C. Evan Stewart,
Whither the Attorney-Client Privilege, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 11, 1990, at 1.
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viduals, application of the Rule is clear; however, when a party
is a corporation, attorneys generally have not had a clear-cut
standard to follow. As a result, an attorney may be confronted
with an ethical dilemma when faced with the opportunity to in-
terview a corporate employee informally. The problem is com-
pounded because courts and bar associations have attempted to
resolve the problem by adopting different tests to interpret the
scope of a corporate "party" by weighing the parties' competing
interests.
In Niesig v. Team I the New York Court of Appeals devised
a definitive, workable interpretation of the breadth of the corpo-
rate "party" in DR 7-104(A)(1). The court adopted a three-part
modified "alter ego" test which places off-limits those corporate
employees who have authority to bind the corporation, whose
acts or omissions may be imputed to the corporation for pur-
poges of its liability, or who are implementing the advice of
counsel. From a public policy standpoint, the Niesig test repre-
sents the best solution to effectuate the goals of Disciplinary
Rule 7-104(A)(1) where parties are corporations. It satisfactorily
balances the need to discover truth and the desire to preserve
adequate. legal representation in the corporate context. In addi-
tion, this test, which derives from case law as well as principles
of agency and evidence law, is legally supportable. Other courts
faced with interpreting the Rule would do well to adopt this
test.
Sophie Hager Hume
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